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On the basis of a random sample of English-language internet websites about empires, we
can now formulate the rst law of comparative imperialisms as follows: as an online
discussion of empire grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving the Roman
Empire approaches 1. (This is a variant of the general law that states that ‘as an online
discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler
approaches 1’.1) The comparative study of empires is thriving, and the recent intensity
of interest is connected, at least in part, to the international military interventions of the
United States.2 But comparisons between empires are nothing new, and, in the 1960s,
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Peter Brunt wrote an insightful article on British and Roman imperialism.3 That analysis
was the product of the age of decolonization, an age which also acted as a spur to
comparative approaches within classical scholarship: witness Nicole Loraux’s suggestion
that it was anti-colonial movements associated with the Algerian and Vietnam wars that
led Jean-Pierre Vernant to embark on his series of comparative investigations into Greek
thought and religion.4 Brunt’s article was written in a retrospective key at a time when it
was possible to look back to the completion, or the near completion, of a major period
of European colonialism and arrive at a sort of reckoning. Some two generations prior
to Brunt, in the early twentieth century and at the apogee of the British Empire, Lord
Cromer delivered an address to the Classical Association on ‘Ancient and Modern
Imperialism’ in which he found it unimaginable to think of independence for Britain’s
overseas colonies.5 Francis Havereld responded sympathetically to Cromer and in his
own writings associated the British and the Roman empires.6 Any discussion of
comparative imperialisms, therefore, will need to consider not just the recent
concentration of debates over empire but also a lengthy trajectory that extends back to
Cromer and Havereld and indeed further beyond into the eighteenth century. None of
the books under review reects in detail on the intellectual history in which they may be
situated, but this is a subject that at least needs to be acknowledged and that we shall
have occasion to return to later.
Why compare empires? One benet of comparison is that it helps to clarify phenomena
and to sharpen the distinctive nature of the objects under scrutiny. Marcel Detienne
famously urged us to ‘compare the incomparable’ and to seek out meaningful
comparisons that genuinely contribute to one’s understanding of the issues and
challenge long-held assumptions. Comparison can lead to demystication and produce a
change in outlook. For historians, as Walter Scheidel says with regard to the two
empires that are discussed in Rome and China, ‘only comparisons with other
civilizations make it possible to distinguish common features from culturally specic or
unique characteristics and developments, help us identify variables that were critical to
particular historical outcomes, and allow us to assess the nature of any given ancient
state or society within the wider context of premodern world history’ (5). Another
reason to undertake comparative study has to do with historical causality. Why did
certain events occur in a culture, what factors contributed to their development, and
could they have occurred elsewhere? ‘The main questions’, Scheidel writes, ‘are which
Comparative History Project, co-ordinated by Walter Scheidel; and the Network on Ancient and Modern
Imperialisms, co-ordinated by the author of this review. Scheidel’s collection on Rome and China grew out of
his project; Rome and China is said to be the rst of many works that will be published on ‘the comparative
institutional study of ancient Rome and early China’ (7).
3 P. A. Brunt, ‘Reections on British and Roman imperialism’, in Roman Imperial Themes (1990), 110–33. First
published in Comparative Studies in Society and History 7 (1964–65), 267–88.
4 N. Loraux, ‘Back to the Greeks? Chronique d’une expédition lointaine en terre commune’, in J. Revel and N.
Wachtel (eds), Une école pour les sciences sociales: de la VIième section à l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences
Sociales (1996), 275–94.
5 Earl of Cromer, Ancient and Modern Imperialism (1910). See also C. P. Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater
Britain (1912). On Cromer and Lucas, see J. Majeed, ‘Comparativism and references to Rome in British
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factors were crucial rather than incidental to observed developments and how different
contexts could produce similar outcomes, or vice versa’ (6). Yet another reason, which
seems not to be explicitly mentioned by Scheidel, perhaps because it is so obvious, is
that comparative analysis of cultures has the potential to generate inferences that have
little direct bearing on either culture but nonetheless speak to the concerns of other
times and places. This is a possibility allowed by Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim
Mittag in Conceiving the Empire, their volume on ancient Rome and China:
‘Comparing the Roman and Chinese empires contributes not only to understanding the
trajectories along which the two civilizations developed, but also to heightening our
awareness of possible analogies between the present and the past, be it with regard to
America or China’ (xiv). Looking at the backgrounds of the contributors to the
collection, the location of the conference out of which it emerged, and the funding from
the VolkswagenStiftung, I am tempted to add the words ‘or Europe’ to that last phrase.
The books under review approach the subject of comparative empires from varying
perspectives. The Dynamics of Ancient Empires and Rome and China are part of a new
book series, Oxford Studies in Early Empires, under the general editorship of Nicola di
Cosmo, Mark Edward Lewis, and Scheidel, and Scheidel played a signicant editorial
rôle in bringing the volumes to publication. Rome and China and Conceiving the
Empire compare the Roman and Chinese empires, but are shaped by divergent concerns
and editorial policies. Vaclav Smil’s book, Why America Is Not a New Rome, is not an
argument for comparative study but a discussion of the problems that bedevil
comparisons of the Roman Empire and the USA. He is not against historical
comparisons per se but nds popular assumptions about similarities between the Roman
Empire and the USA to be misguided, inaccurate, and unhelpful. Collectively, these
books reect on the burgeoning eld of comparative imperialisms and illustrate the
benets of comparative study; they also raise questions about method and illustrate the
challenges faced by comparativists.
I
The issue of imperial comparison is developed with a little more sophistication in Scheidel’s
Rome and China than in Mutschler and Mittag’s Conceiving the Empire, although both
volumes might have treated the conceptual and theoretical problems raised by
comparison in more detail. In an extraordinary editorial decision, Mutschler and Mittag
asked their contributors not to make any comparisons themselves and relegated
comparative analysis to an epilogue written by the two of them. ‘In order to relieve
individual contributors of the strain of constant comparison between the two cultures,
we asked them to concentrate their discussion on either the Roman or the Chinese
perspective according to their expertise. It seemed to us that in this way the authors’
competence could be utilized most effectively’ (xvi). Readers of the book may well nd
themselves wishing that the contributors had made some effort at comparative analysis
even if they had not burdened themselves with ‘the strain of constant comparison’. The
chapters are grouped together by topic into eight pairs, and the juxtaposition of
chapters affords a manner of oblique comparison. A few contributors, among them
notably Mutschler himself, attempt to provide comparative reection, but the
opportunity for comparison is left to ‘a future dialogue between the two elds’ (xvi). In
this sense, the collection is similar to The Dynamics of Ancient Empires, edited by Ian
Morris and Scheidel, in which explicit comparison is undertaken in the rst and last
chapters alone, and in which the hope is expressed that the book ‘will encourage more
systematic and comparative thinking about the nature and development of imperial
states in early history, and serve as building blocks for cross-cultural studies’ (vi). The
reader is assured that the ‘project has inspired all the participants to engage in more
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explicitly comparative and multidisciplinary work on early empires’ and that the editors
‘will measure this book’s success by its capacity to motivate our present and future
colleagues to do the same’ (vi). In defence of The Dynamics of Ancient Empires, while
the book does refer to comparative study in editorial comments that describe the
publication’s goal (v, 103), it does not announce the comparative study of empires in its
title, which rather promises a treatment of ‘state power from Assyria to Byzantium’.
It would be easy to fault the editors and the contributors for the style of their
comparisons and for inconsistencies in method, rather than acknowledge their
accomplishments. I might point out that the chapters in the two books about Rome and
China occasionally elide the difference between trading contacts and comparison. Trade,
commerce, and maritime links may shape the interpretive context, but the details of
commerce and trading networks cannot serve as a substitute for comparative analysis,
nor are they necessary for it. I might also observe that the scholar who interrogates his
or her own location and methodological assumptions stands to accomplish more than
the discovery of putative similarities or differences across empires. It is common to have
one’s own hypotheses conrmed, or repudiated, by the evidence when the basis of those
hypotheses hides in obscurity, and at times the basis for comparison could have been
subjected to greater scrutiny in these volumes. And I might have wished that the two
books in the Oxford series had explained their choice of subject further. Rome and
China is said to be about ‘state-society relations’ (8) but that is vague and scarcely
begins to account for the particular direction taken by the chapters in the book. The
editors of The Dynamics of Ancient Empires asked their authors to discuss ‘how
empires were run, how they extracted resources, and what their long-term consequences
were’ (vi), and, needless to say, the authors have responded to the broad mandate in
very different ways.
But I do not suggest that these books are edited or written by scholars who have given
little thought to the comparative method, for that is clearly not the case. The three edited
collections consist of chapters written by experts who display a masterful knowledge of
their subjects, and a strength of the books is the historical documentation that they offer
to future comparativists. Comparative study is hard and takes the scholar out of his or
her comfort zone, and I do not make light of the amount of time and effort required to
work in two or more cultures. With respect to Rome and China, areas of future
research are sketched out in two breathtaking sentences by Scheidel (4). The rst, and
much longer, of the two sets down ‘convergent trends over time’ and takes up the better
part of a page as it ranges from ‘the growth of markets in land and the gradual
concentration of wealth among elites’ to ‘the creation of a homogeneous elite culture
and of corpora of classics’ to ‘ideologies of normative empire sustained by transcendent
powers’ and many other topics. The second lays out signicant differences between
Rome and China and refers to ‘the Republican background of the Roman state’ and ‘the
scale and functions of slave labor’, among other subjects. Exploring the areas of study
described by Scheidel in these two sentences would be a worthwhile pursuit, to which
he has devoted himself enthusiastically with numerous publications.
If comparison is worthwhile, does it help us answer any of the fundamental questions of
human behaviour? Have we learned, for example, what drives people to conquer and
establish empires? We certainly have, according to Scheidel, and the answer is ‘Sex’. In a
remarkable tour de force called ‘Sex and Empire’, which appears as the last chapter of
The Dynamics of Ancient Empires, Scheidel writes that, from a long-term evolutionary
perspective, ‘since genetic survival (i.e., successful replication) is contingent on scarce
energy resources, reproductive processes inevitably involve competition, which in turn
drives evolution in response to natural selection’ (256). To be fair, Scheidel generally
uses a language that is easier to understand than that quotation implies and he makes a
great deal of evolutionary biology accessible to prove his point about the ultimate causes
of empire. Where Michael Mann took for granted that humans were prone ‘to increase
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their means of subsistence’, Scheidel pushes the level of explanation further back and asks
why human beings would desire to increase their means of subsistence, their control over
resources, and their power.7 His is an avowedly androcentric theory, grounded in Darwin’s
argument that men have historically sought to increase their reproductive success through
competition with other men. Women are biologically different from men, and need to make
a relatively high level of investment in pregnancy, breast-feeding, and the nurture of infants,
but men make smaller investments than women in these areas and are free to compete with
other men and deny them reproductive opportunities. When men co-operate with each
other in warfare or imperialism, they are seeking to improve their reproductive capacity
and to generate conditions as favourable as possible for reproductive success. The
question we should thus be asking about ancient empire, Scheidel observes, is ‘whether
or how it facilitated the exploitation of reproductive capacity’ (258).
This is theory on the grand scale and cuts across cultures and historical periods.
Scheidel’s chapter is not strictly comparative in the sense that Rome and China is
comparative, and he does not compare phenomena across two or more cultures in
writing about sex and empire. He draws on evidence from a wide variety of cultures
and on studies from a range of disciplines, though not with the stated purpose of
comparison. But his chapter is concerned with ‘ultimate causation’ (260) and disregards
the stated motives and ideologies of human beings and empires since these could mask
the true evolutionary imperatives that are at the centre of imperialism. Not all narratives
are so nakedly about power and about reproductive success as the myth of the Sabine
women or the stories recounted in Herodotus’ proem. However, Scheidel writes:
This is not to say that perceived motivation is wholly irrelevant; if the claim that contemporary
American men on average think of sex every ve minutes during their waking hours is valid
cross-culturally, the average man (depending on mean life expectancy) will think of sex
between 2.5 and 5 million times in his postpubescent lifetime. By implication, all men who
ever lived on earth must have thought of sex approximately 50 quadrillion times. It is hard
to imagine that this persistent reex (which squares superbly with evolutionary theory) has
been of no importance to conscious motivation. Even so, Darwinian theory can be
empirically corroborated only by observed or attested behavior. (261)
Scheidel offers these statistics partly in jest, and it would be wise not to take calculations
that are based on the sexual obsessiveness of American men too seriously. Nevertheless,
the point about observed or attested behaviour is made in earnest, and, in his view, the
evidence shows that ‘imperial success increased the reproductive success and inclusive
tness of primary beneciaries’ and also that ‘imperial success enabled those
beneciaries to engage in behavior that would ordinarily promote reproductive success’
(261). Thus, while explicit justications are hard to nd of the claim that ancient
empires were ‘established in order to facilitate sexual exploitation’, an abundance of
materials exists to support the argument in terms of ‘the most fundamental underlying
behavioral mechanisms’ (306). Scheidel’s learning is manifestly impressive and it is put
to judicious use as he quotes from studies about not just the Roman Empire, Athens,
Sparta, and Persia but also the Inca, the Dahomey empire, medieval Khmer rulers, and
North Korea.
An important point about causality is raised by Scheidel, and the point is worth
emphasizing since it is also raised, if indirectly, by some of the other chapters in the
books under review. Scheidel writes in Rome and China that comparative study does
not search for laws of causation but does ‘offer causal explanations of particular
outcomes by identifying critical differences between similar situations and/or by
identifying robust processes that occur in different settings’ (6). Causation is a complex
7 M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (1986), 5.
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phenomenon, and a long tradition of philosophical and scientic enquiry that goes back at
least to Aristotle has been devoted to the topic. Historians are familiar with the post hoc
ergo propter hoc fallacy and are trained to avoid it. They know that correlation alone
does not imply causation and they do not suppose, because Germany always wins the
Eurovision song contest when it is a good year for grapes in Chile, that the Chilean
grape harvest is the cause of the German triumph. For the most part, the authors under
consideration are sensitive to causal complexity, avoid monocausal determinism, and
maintain a stance of intellectual openness in describing the relationship between human
agency, events, and contexts. ‘Sex and Empire’ is exceptional in these analyses in so far
as Scheidel offers a causal theory on one of the largest time-frames imaginable. Informed
by social Darwinism and inected by a mixture of ancient history, anthropology,
political theory, and gender studies, his provocative argument deliberately sets out to be
reductive and to divine a unifying cause. The other authors are less controversial, but
the reader is occasionally stopped short by some claims. In a ne chapter in Rome and
China, Nathan Rosenstein writes: ‘In the absence of a military threat that would have
compelled Rome to develop in the ways that China did and because coalition building
and, after 338 B.C.E., the incorporation of many non-Romans into the Republic’s citizen
body enabled it to meet successfully the threats it did face, the aristocracy’s self-interests
could determine how the Roman state evolved’ (50). I think I understand the general
argument that Rosenstein is making in his chapter, but he appears to be saying here that
a military threat or series of military threats could have driven the Republic ‘to develop
in the ways that China did’. It is one thing to say that ‘war profoundly affected the
trajectories of state-formation in China and Rome’ (49) or that differences between
Rome and China can be attributed ‘in part’ to military conicts, as Rosenstein does
earlier (29); it is quite another to say that wars, even wars of a particular type, would
have made the Republic develop as China did and result in the creation of ‘highly
bureaucratized central administrations … capable of extending the government’s reach
down to the level of ve household units’ (49). If the writer were rigorous in thinking
through cause and effect, he would have had to eliminate every other possible factor
and nd that wars inexorably led to highly bureaucratized central administrations in
China and would do so as well in Rome. I accept that the evidence from antiquity is
limited and that some level of correlation is inevitable in judgements about the ancient
world, but a level of caution is desirable in transposing causal explanations from one
culture to another. It should be said that Rosenstein makes a pretty interesting case
overall for the relationship between external threats and internal administrative change
in Rome and China.
While Scheidel and Rosenstein draw our attention to coercion and the body in their
writings, I think the body and gender could be treated more capaciously in these books
and in the comparative study of ancient empires.8 A few possibilities are considered by
Scheidel in ‘Sex and Empire’ when he sketches out the demographic concerns that
emerge more clearly from his evolutionary model of imperialism. By his count, Roman
Britain held about 40,000 soldiers in their twenties and thirties and about 200,000 to
300,000 women ranging in age from fteen to thirty-ve. Of the soldiers, a small
fraction would have been native but most would have been of foreign origin, and many
local women would have had their choice of foreign mates or spouses, at least in theory.
Scheidel believes that the gender imbalance ‘would have reached a comparable scale in
other frontier zones, above all the valleys of the Rhine and the Danube’ and he observes
that ‘these sexual repercussions of Roman imperialism have yet to be acknowledged in
modern studies of provincial “Romanization”’ (303). Even if Scheidel is over-condent
in the gures that he provides and overly reliant on a difcult sociobiology, he is right
8 See P. Pomper, ‘The history and theory of empires’, History and Theory 44 (2005), 1–27.
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to call for more study (comparative and non-comparative) than we have at present of the
kinds of sexual relationships (consenting, coercive, non-coercive) that were facilitated by
the Roman Empire in frontier regions and the provinces.9
Writing in Rome and China, Karen Turner and Maria H. Dettenhofer provide different
perspectives on the body from those offered by Scheidel or Rosenstein. Dettenhofer writes
that court eunuchs were established in China as early as the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.E.),
whereas in Rome eunuchs gained in political importance only after the reigns of Diocletian
and Constantine; in the Roman case, they were mainly freed slaves from Armenia and
Persia and many were to occupy the rôle of imperial chamberlain, praepositus sacri
cubiculi. Dettenhofer discusses the association between the status of women and
eunuchs in courtly culture but notes that, with notable exceptions, Roman eunuchs were
not assigned to women’s quarters. Her chapter points to a dense cluster of issues
connected with women, the phallus, the body, intimacy, religion, ethnicity, and power
and shows that there is more to be understood about eunuchs (already the subject of a
great deal of research across cultures) through cross-cultural study. Turner looks at ‘law
and punishment in the formation of empire’ and weighs the difference between Chinese
and Roman attitudes to corporal punishment. She argues ‘that much earlier than in the
West, China developed a Foucauldian notion of biopower: the categorizing,
standardizing, control, and mobilization of individual bodies to serve the state. The
Chinese case challenges Foucault’s contention that a passion for organizing bodies for
their productive capacities marked a shift in political life from classical to modern
systems’ (77). For her, ‘the criminal body served more as a site of symbolic retribution
than an economic asset’ in the Roman Empire, and criminals were part of a spectacle of
chastisement in which penalized bodies were put on display (78). Turner and
Dettenhofer might have rened slightly the dichotomies they present, but their chapters
illustrate the divergent attitudes taken toward the human body, toward its integrity and
mutilation, its exploitation and deployment for labour, and its capacity for symbolic
display.
Turner and Dettenhofer also rely less on quantitative data than co-authors such as
Scheidel, whose agility with statistical and economic evidence is nothing less than
remarkable. This raises a broader issue in so far as many of the chapters in Rome and
China and The Dynamics of Ancient Empires are laden with data, statistical analyses,
and quantitative studies, and in so far as many contributors make qualitative
generalizations on the basis of quantitative study. The use of quantitative materials can
be attractive to historians since it allows them to work toward an imagined precision.
Why historians of empire indulge in this kind of analysis is not difcult to understand,
given that many empires have been supported by the maintenance of archives, records,
and highly evolved systems of classication and often have left behind evidence that
lends itself to statistical analysis. But some vigilance in these matters is warranted in
dealing with the ancient world, given the many lacunae in the evidence, the differences
in conceptual systems, and the intractable foreignness of antiquity. While it would be
tempting to learn how other societies compare with the Roman Empire in terms of its
supposed economic growth, for example, we should register Keith Hopkins’ warning
that the desire to see economic growth in ancient Rome may be ‘an attempt to nd the
roots of modern experience in classical antiquity’ (Dynamics, 195). Perhaps inevitably,
these books illustrate both the strengths and pitfalls of scholarship based on quantitative
analyses; they open up new vistas onto the ancient world by coaxing fresh meanings out
of the old sources and also appear to atten out the complexity and otherness of their
objects of study.
9 For an approach to sex and ‘Romanization’ on the frontiers, see D. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity:
Experiencing the Roman Empire (2011), 94–121 (= ch. 4, ‘Power, Sex, and Empire’).
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II
The universalist conceptualization of empire is broached in Conceiving the Empire by
several authors, including Mittag and Mutschler, who come to it through a
consideration of the terms tianxia (‘All-under-Heaven’) and imperium and, to a lesser
degree, oikoumene and orbis terrarum.10 Mittag and Mutschler argue, ‘Whereas in
China the idea of tianxia was intensively discussed long before the unication of the
empire, in Rome ideas of empire and imperial rule developed only with the emergence
of the historical phenomenon itself’ (430–1). Given the fragmentary nature of early
Roman sources, this is a hypothetical statement at best, but the issue is also discussed in
three pairs of perceptive papers on geography (Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer and Katherine
Clarke), large inscriptions (Martin Kern and Christian Witschel), and art and
architecture (Rolf Michael Schneider and Michèle Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens). Of these
papers, Kern’s reading of the inscriptions of the Qin First Emperor shows that the
function of the inscriptions was public, symbolic, and performative. Too remote and too
elevated to be read by human beings, the inscriptions demonstrated that ‘sovereignty
even extended from the human sphere into the cosmic realm, transforming a natural site
into a site of civilization and human history’ (225). These inscriptions sought to efface
earlier histories and claimed that ‘the normative version of history as promulgated from
the sacred mountains of the former independent states was a single and unied one’
(226). The inscriptions also refer to the details of their own ritual creation and
recitation, thereby ‘integrating the ritual act of reciting merit and inscribing the stele into
the purview of the foregoing historical narrative and at the same time bringing the
narrative to its logical conclusion’ (237). Kern explores the performative force of
inscriptions elegantly, and his chapter should be read alongside not just Witschel’s
treatment of the Res Gestae but also Clarke’s evocative analysis of the production of
space in Rome, Pirazolli’s chapter on the image of the other in Han art, Schneider’s on
the shaping of Augustan Rome, and Michael Nylan’s on ‘the rhetoric of “empire”’ in
China. The authors do not offer extensive comparisons, in conformity with the volume’s
editorial policy, but Mittag and Mutschler discuss the communicative framework and
the ideological content of imperial representations as they are presented in these
chapters. This is one of the most helpful sections of the editors’ epilogue, and yet I
cannot help thinking that an opportunity has been lost for a more detailed comparison
across chapters.
The signicance of universalizing discourses and practices is also raised by Josef
Wiesehöfer and Ian Morris in relation to Achaemenid Persia and Athens, respectively, in
The Dynamics of Ancient Empires, another volume that eschews direct comparison as a
matter of principle. In his astute account of the Achaemenid Empire, Wiesehöfer writes
that ‘the idea of a universal empire propagated and symbolically promulgated by the
king was present in the Achaemenid Empire’ (87), and one speculates that the royal
inscriptions of Darius and Xerxes would provide a stimulating comparison with the stele
inscriptions of the Qin First Emperor from this perspective. Wiesehöfer traces the
tension between the universalist tendencies of Achaemenid ideology and the profuse
diversity of subject peoples and he shows how the Achaemenids seldom compelled
inhabitants of their empire ‘to choose between an “imperial” and a “local” identity’; in
his example, a resident of Smyrna could retain a Greek civic identity and simultaneously
be ‘invited to regard himself as — and to be proud of being — a member of the most
successful and prosperous entity of his own time, the Persian Empire’ (89–90). The
10 They explore historical universalism further in A. Mittag and F.-H. Mutschler, ‘Empire and humankind:
historical universalism in ancient China and Rome’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37 (2010), 527–55. The
article appears in a special issue devoted to universalism and globalization in ancient Greece, Rome and China.
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word ‘invited’ is intriguing since the dominant ideology scarcely permitted the subject to
break free of Persian overlordship and it is reminiscent of Achaemenid ‘tolerance’,
which, as Wiesehöfer says, could be described as ‘just a way to keep the conquered
peoples quiet’ (88).
In a dense and dazzling study entitled ‘The Greater Athenian State’, Morris suggests that
Athens failed to convert its universalizing rhetoric and practice into a larger state that could
reasonably be dened as an empire. He declares that fth-century Athens was not an
empire and that ‘far from creating an empire — dened, as above, as a territorially
extensive, hierarchical, multiethnic political organization with a strong sense of
foreignness between rulers and ruled — fth-century Athens tried to develop an Ionian
Greek territorial state with Athens as its capital city’ (141).11 Morris agrees with those
who argue that we should not think in terms of an ‘Athenian Empire’ and draws
attention to the putative empire’s many diminutive features, not least in geographical
extent, total revenues (1 or 2 per cent of the early Roman Empire), and population
(fewer than a million against the 50 or 60 million in the Han or Roman empires). He
writes that inhabitants in cities subject to Athenian rule ‘often did feel different from the
Athenians, but their differences were political rather than ethnic, linguistic, religious, or
cultural’ (134). For him, fth-century Athens should be studied as part of the
phenomenon of state formation, which he views as an ongoing process rather than a
static or unitary event. As Morris is aware, many have criticized state formation for
being overly deterministic, of limited heuristic value, and too reductive to account for
socio-economic complexity, political change, and cultural difference. Few scholars have
worked through the issue with greater dexterity and learning than Morris, however, and
he offers as shapely a discussion as we are likely to get of fth-century Athens from the
perspective of state formation in the Aegean. Within the terms of his argument, he
signals an area that will prompt further reection among historians of ancient Greece
and Rome. He asks, ‘why did Athens, the most modern Greek state with the biggest
population, most advanced technology, most meritocratic administration, and deepest
state capacity, fail to break through to become rst a territorial Greek state and then a
multiethnic empire?’ (167). Another way of asking the question is to contrast Athens’
inability to make that breakthrough with Rome’s success in imperial state formation, for
an implication of Morris’ work ‘is that the most protable comparison for
fth-century-B.C.E. Greece might be fth-century-B.C.E. Rome, and the most useful
question to ask about such a comparison might be why Rome succeeded in breaking out
of the city-state framework to become rst a territorial state and then a genuine
multiethnic empire, while Athens did not’ (141). A further question raised by Morris’
chapter is the ideological investment, at least of modern Anglophone scholars, in the use
of the expression ‘Athenian Empire’. Why the term was used in the rst place and how
it has determined the course of subsequent scholarship about fth-century Athens are
questions that we have only just begun to address.12
As the papers by Clarke, Kern, and Schneider remind us, élites will control ideological
and symbolic elements within a cultural framework in their desire to maintain and prolong
their grip on state power. The point is also made by Jack A. Goldstone and John F. Haldon
in the opening chapter of The Dynamics of Ancient Empires, where they offer the Chola
and Vijayanagar empires in South Asia as cases in which central authority could endure
11 As Morris suggests, the naming of the ‘Athenian Empire’ is not a question of denition alone but of the nature
of Athenian rule. On this issue, see P. Low, ‘The Athenian empire’, in G. Boys-Stones, B. Graziosi and P. Vasunia
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies (2009), 65–76, with the classic essay of M. I. Finley, ‘The
Athenian empire: a balance sheet’, in P. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds), Imperialism in the Ancient World
(1978), 101–26, and reprinted in Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (1981), ch. 3
12 For a discussion of some of the problems associated with the term, see T. Harrison, ‘Through British eyes: the
Athenian empire and modern historiography’, in B. Goff (ed.), Classics and Colonialism (2005), 25–37.
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‘simply through the manipulation of key ideological and symbolic elements in the cultural
system of the social formation as a whole’ (10). When élites inuence the symbolic system
that underpins an empire’s ideology, they need to rely even less on the military or on other
instruments of coercive power in order to survive and adapt over time, and the more
successful the management of ideological and symbolic elements, the greater will be the
appeal and acceptance of the imperial state among élite and non-élite populations. ‘A
good example of more lasting imperial power is provided by the case of Rome’,
Goldstone and Haldon write, ‘in which a conquest state was able to evolve an
ideological hegemony that in turn generated a consensual identity among the conquered
territories’ (11). If that ideological hegemony took various forms and exerted its power
on subjects who lived in a land mass that now covers some forty countries, it had to
accomplish its work through a language and visual culture that would speak to as many
as possible: all those temples to Jupiter, statues of emperors, triumphal arches, and even
the sewers and steam baths were connections to Rome and a reafrmation of its
inuence. Hopkins observes, ‘To be Roman was to be sweaty and clean. The Roman
Empire was an empire of conquest but also a unitary symbolic system’ (186).
The success of the Roman Empire in evolving its ideological hegemony can also be
measured in its political economy, as Hopkins implies in The Dynamics of Ancient
Empires.13 Hopkins documents the increase in money supply in the Roman Empire from
the second century B.C.E. to the second century C.E. and he notes, for instance, that the
volume of silver coinage in circulation in the middle of the second century C.E. was
about four times larger than in 50 B.C.E. (1.76 billion denarii against 410 million,
without Egypt). But what does this growth in the money supply mean and can it simply
be correlated to trade and economic ‘growth’? For Hopkins, the emperors ‘produced
coins as economic objects for the facilitation of trade and taxation but above all as
symbolic objects of ostentation and political authority’ (201–2). Hopkins is right in this
case not to equate ancient and modern economic concepts too closely and to embed the
increase in money supply within the wider Roman socio-political order. Here there is
further scope for comparison with Han China and the materials assembled by Scheidel
in Rome and China. In a detailed study of the monetary systems of the Han and Roman
empires, Scheidel uses some of the same data as Hopkins and points out that
monetization was far greater in the Roman Empire, which operated on a monetary
economy of silver and gold, than in Han China, which used bronze coinage and
uncoined precious metal. He believes ‘in a dramatic surge of Mediterranean trade and
production for a mass market in the Roman period and the growing wealth of the
Roman elite that does not seem to have been matched by that of its Han peers’ and
calls for more systematic exploration of the difference (205).14
Happily, some of the socio-political implications of economic phenomena in Rome and
China are discussed by Peter Fibiger Bang and Mark Edward Lewis in Scheidel’s own
volume. Bang describes the Roman Empire and Han China as tributary systems and
briey refers to imperial styles of consumption in the two empires. Moralizing strictures
against luxury and worldly ostentation can be found in both Rome and China and,
according to Bang, ‘did nothing effectively to counter the new luxurious styles of
consumption’ (118). Bang is keen to point to the similarities between the Roman Empire
and Han China (he calls them ‘comparable worlds’, 120). The resemblances are well
stated; and it remains interesting to see an analysis of the different ways in which
13 Keith Hopkins died in March 2004, and this chapter may be his last published work. He made astute use of
Chinese evidence in his article, ‘The political power of eunuchs’, PCPS 189 (1963), 62–80, revised in Conquerors
and Slaves (1978), ch. 4.
14 See also W. Scheidel, ‘The divergent evolution of coinage in eastern and western Eurasia’, in W. V. Harris (ed.),
The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans (2008), 267–86, and W. Scheidel and S. J. Friesen, ‘The size of
the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, JRS 99 (2009), 61–91.
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empires exhibit the ‘power to consume and command the world in all its great variety’ and
to understand how empires have strategically used materialist consumption in order to
further political domination and vice-versa (103). Lewis looks at the political and
sociological aspects of gift-giving in Rome and China and notes a contrast between
prevailing ideologies of imperial rule in Rome and Han China. While euergetism in
imperial Rome was focused on the city and occurred in urban spaces, gift-giving in Han
China was largely directed at the countryside. ‘This difference reects the political
distinction between the Roman Empire, which was structured as a multiplicity of urban
centers — both old established ones and new ones built to a standard model — and the
Chinese Empire, where the political power of the ruler and his agents derived directly
from the registration, mobilization, and taxation of rural households’ (131–2). I hesitate
over this characterization of the Roman Empire but the distinct geo-spatial orientations
of Roman and Chinese gift-giving are worth reecting on. Through a comparison of
gift-giving cultures, Lewis shows differences in attitudes to the work-force in the country
and the city and he discusses how imperial authority and prestige was constructed in
varying ways in Rome and Han China. The appearance of the emperor in public at the
Roman games enacted a visual reciprocity between the crowd and the ruler, and
the emperor’s gifts to the people included not just the spectacle inside the arena but also
the bodily presence of himself and his family members.15 By contrast, the emperor did
not show himself to the public in Qin and Han China, and the authority of the ruler
was rather augmented by his invisibility to the general population. ‘Sealed up behind
layer and layer of walls, the emperor rewarded only his closest followers with the
supreme honor of letting them come into his presence. This power of the inside over
the outside, and of the hidden over the visible, became a longstanding principle of the
spatial construction of power in imperial China’ (133). The emperor’s body was strictly
not for the public gaze in China, and the sight of it was heavily regulated even within
the space of the palace. Lewis’ argument thus circles us back to concerns raised
elsewhere in Rome and China, namely, to the authority enjoyed by court eunuchs, who
mediated between the sovereign and the subject, to the distinction between symbolic and
economic uses of the body, and to the question of the biopolitical.
III
The most popular imperial comparison of the moment involves Rome and the USA. As the
trickle turns into a ood, it is impossible to keep up with the many articles, books, internet
sites, and documentaries that pose the comparison. Even after 2009, with the end of the
Bush era in Washington, D.C., the election of a new president in Barack Obama, and
what seems to be the advent of a changed American foreign policy, the number of
works about Rome and the USA shows no sign of abating. Many classical journals and
classical scholars have stayed away from these discussions, perhaps because they have
doubts about the rigour of the arguments that are bandied about by commentators, or
because they despair about the historical inaccuracy of the details, or simply because
they wish to avoid controversies about the political present. This journal, too, has not
commissioned a review of any recent book that attempts to compare ancient Roman
and American imperialism.16 A few classical scholars, more intrepid than their silent
colleagues, have joined the discussions, supplemented them with their own critiques,
explored the similarities between the Roman Empire and American Empire, or rejected
15 P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique (1976).
16 M. Malamud, Ancient Rome and Modern America (2009), which is partly on the subject, is reviewed in this
issue of JRS below.
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the comparisons as unhelpful and partial. A smaller number still have even encouraged the
comparisons and exhorted America to follow in the path of Rome.17 But now here from
the pen of Vaclav Smil comes Why America Is Not a New Rome, an entire book
designed to nish off the idea that America and Rome are similar in any meaningful
way. A professor of the environment, Smil has written prolically about energy, food,
and environmental affairs. For this book, he has immersed himself in Roman history —
he proclaims Scheidel ‘the most incisive analyst of Roman society’ (118) — and digested
a huge amount of information about the ancient world as well as about the United
States. Among his admirers is Bill Gates, who has written a review of Why America Is
Not a New Rome in which he refers to Smil as ‘a great student of history, including
Roman history and the dynamics of its Empire over time’.18
Smil’s major aim is to refute the claim that Rome and America are similar, his secondary
aim is to show that America is not an empire, and he seeks to meet these in a prose that
is clear, direct, and forceful. He says his book ‘is not a book of comparative history —
not histoire comparative but histoire comparée using Marc Bloch’s (1928) classic
distinction — and not preoccupied by any specic methodological concerns or written
to meet the approbation of professional reductionist historians’ (2).19 He has a number
of targets to choose from, including Charles Krauthammer, Cullen Murphy and Joseph
Nye, in the USA, and Peter Bender, Jonathan Freedland and Giovanni Viansino, in
Europe.20 These writers have been inuential at a variety of levels, and I can attest to
the popularity among university students of Murphy’s book, Are We Rome?, and
Freedland’s article ‘Rome, AD … Rome, DC?’ (published in the Guardian, in 2002, it
accompanied a television programme ‘Rome: The Model Empire’, presented by
Freedland). Smil’s attacks are rarely ad hominem, and he writes that his ‘only goals are
to inquire, illuminate, and explain and thus, I hope, to understand’ (2). The book
contains many pages of useful information, and it will be read eagerly by students
looking for help with their assignments and papers.
The relentless argument of the book is to insist that Rome and America are not the same:
when he writes that he is repudiating ‘comparisons’, what Smil means is that he is ghting
against claims about the similarity of Rome and America. Smil’s analysis might be more
17 J. R. Fears, ‘The Lessons of the Roman Empire for America Today’, Heritage Lecture 917 (19 December 2005);
the lecture is available online at the website of the Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org/). The classical
scholar Victor Davis Hanson was also a strong public supporter of the invasion of Iraq; many of his publications
are available online at http://victorhanson.com/.
18 See B. Gates, ‘Comparing America and ancient Rome’ (posted 21 October 2010), http://www.thegatesnotes.
com/Learning/article.aspx?ID=175.
19 M. Bloch, ‘Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes’, Revue de synthèse historique 46 (1928),
15–50.
20 C. Krauthammer, ‘The Bush doctrine’, Time (5 March 2001); J. Freedland, ‘Rome, AD … Rome, DC?’, The
Guardian (18 September 2002); J. Nye, ‘The new Rome meets the new barbarians’, The Economist (23 March
2002); P. Bender, Weltmacht Amerika das neue Rom (2003) and ‘America: the new Roman Empire’, Orbis 47
(2003), 145–59; G. Viansino, Impero romano, impero americano. Ideologie e prassi (2005); C. Murphy, Are
We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America (2007). Murphy’s book was published in the UK
under the title The New Rome: The Fall of the Roman Empire and the Fate of America.
Many others have broached the comparison; see e.g. E. Eakin, ‘All roads lead to D.C.’, The New York Times
(31 March 2002); R. D. Kaplan, ‘Supremacy by stealth’, Atlantic Monthly (July–August 2003), 66–83; H. James,
The Roman Predicament: How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire (2006); J. R. Dunn,
‘On going Roman’, American Thinker (3 January 2007); T. F. Madden, Empires of Trust: How Rome Built —
and America is Building — a New World (2008); A. Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax
Romana, Britannica and Americana (2009); and P. Brendon, ‘Like Rome before the fall? Not yet’, The
New York Times (25 February 2010). See also W. V. Spanos, America’s Shadow (2000).
For a critique of Kaplan and other neoconservative authors, see J. Schell, ‘The new American order (letter from
Ground Zero)’, The Nation 277 (7 July 2003), and P. López Barja de Quiroga, ‘Citizenship and empire. Rome and
the United States’, in B. Antela-Bernárdez and T. Ñaco del Hoyo (eds), Transforming Historical Landscapes in the
Ancient Empires, BAR Int. Ser. 1986 (2009), 175–80.
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effective were he to work with a deeper sense of ‘comparison’ and to recognize that the best
comparisons are products of the creative imagination and not merely exercises designed to
prove a statistical outcome. He tends to focus on similarity and difference, when a subtle
grasp of the relationship between past and present is called for. But the study of the
classical tradition is a difcult business. Tracing inuences across time and place,
working out the uses of Rome over generations and centuries, sifting through the
legacies of empire and colonialism, analysing how individuals or institutions receive and
refashion the past in responding to the pressures of the present, all of these processes
require a layered sense of history and defeat the best intentions of pamphleteers,
polemicists, and political theorists. Often carried away by the enthusiasm of his own
arguments, Smil offers refutations that are presentist and unduly extended and
sometimes also unnecessary. He asks, ‘Is not the fact of dramatically different lives in
the Roman world and in the modern United States a truism not worth belaboring?’
(33). And so we are given page after page of data on ‘average income, affordable
consumption, wealth distribution, and housing space’ and ‘energy use, reliance on
inanimate prime movers, infant mortality, or common morbidity’ (146). The many
differences between ancient Rome and the USA are weighed up, Rome is found wanting,
and we learn that ‘by any comparative measure, an average Roman lived in misery, and
an average American enjoys a level of afuence unprecedented in human history’ (146).
I nd that an unsurprising conclusion but also think it unhistorical and inadequately
contextualized. A little more useful is the conclusion Smil arrives at later in the book
where he states that ‘the most notable commonality between ancient Rome and modern
America is the (vastly exaggerated) perception of their respective powers’ (158).
One of the interesting features of the comparisons between ancient Rome and the United
States is their sheer volume and intensity. No one thinks that Rome and the USA are the
same, and we may differ with each other on whether the USA can legitimately be
described as an empire. But a pressing question is, why do so many feel the need to
make the comparison? And why do so many feel the need to call the USA an ‘empire’?
The answers to those questions are different but also connected, and the truth is that
many critics and intellectuals have come to believe that the USA is an empire, that it
resembles ancient Rome in this respect, and that its own decline lies in the near future.
The subject of empire remains an emotive issue globally, and critics of American foreign
policy will continue to use terms such as ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ in expressing their
opposition.21 It was precisely because empire roused strong passions that George
W. Bush said, in 2004, in his State of the Union speech, ‘We have no desire to
dominate, no ambitions of empire’, and it was to take the wind out of the sails of their
critics on the left that neo-conservative writers sought for a while to redene imperialism
as a desirable strategy for America. Smil’s remark that he conceived his book without
‘any ideological message in mind’ is, therefore, puzzling and somewhat belated (2).
Today, only the most disinterested intellectual, or the most naive, or the most
21 For (critical, triumphalist, and other) analyses of the USA as an empire, see e.g. G. Vidal, The Decline and Fall
of the American Empire (1992); A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy (2002); V. Prashad, War against the Planet: The Fifth Afghan War, Imperialism and Other
Assorted Fundamentalisms (2002); M. Ignatieff, ‘The American empire: the burden’, The New York Times
Magazine (5 January 2003); D. Harvey, The New Imperialism (2003; reissued in 2005); M. Mann, Incoherent
Empire (2003); E. Todd, After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, trans. C. Jon Delogu
(2003; Après L’Empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain, 2001); A. Ahmad, Iraq, Afghanistan
and the Imperialism of Our Time (2004); N. Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (2004) and
Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (2004); A. Roy, An Ordinary Person’s Guide To Empire
(2004); C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (2000) and The Sorrows of
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (2005); C. S. Maier, Among Empires: American
Ascendancy and its Predecessors (2006); B. Porter, Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World
(2006). This is a very small sample of a vast literature.
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disingenuous could write a book that denied America was an empire and also claim that
the book had no ideological import. The more urgent task would be to understand why
so many around the world feel sufciently oppressed and disheartened by the USA and
its allies to want to call it an ‘empire’. For all the good that it has accomplished in the
world, the US government has followed a policy of military intervention in Vietnam,
Granada, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to name just a few places, that has led many
internationally to think of it as imperialist. Frankly, America has given its attackers
plenty of reasons for criticism, and whether or not they are right to call it an ‘empire’,
the heavy weight of the charges still sticks. Take away the name ‘empire’, but the
militarism, unilateralism, regime changes, attempts at nation building, and hypocrisy in
foreign policy remain inextricably associated with the history of the USA.
‘To those who have long analyzed global politics through the lens of empire’, Jennifer
Pitts observes, ‘whether from postcolonial or Marxist or other perspectives, the spate of
literature on American empire produced since 2001 often seems to misperceive the
phenomenon, to see novelty and exception in the American case where students of
empire recognize reiterations of older patterns and tropes, or conversely to seek too
simple lessons from past empires.’22 Debates about whether a particular nation was an
‘empire’ go back, in English alone, to the later years of the eighteenth century if not
earlier. The word ‘empire’ itself has a fraught and complicated history over the
nineteenth century, a history that many twentieth-century and twenty-rst-century
intellectuals appear to forget when they hold forth on the subject.23 While it remains an
urgent task to understand the status of comparative imperialisms at this particular
conjunction of political, economic, and social forces, American imperialism should not
be examined in isolation but seen within a large frame of global and historical concerns.
The comparative study of empires has enjoyed a resurgence because of the rôle played
by the United States of America in world affairs since 1989, and, especially, because of
US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the comparative study of empires is
explicable in so many ways that it can also be thought of as overdetermined — the
dominance of the USA, the rise of China on the international stage, the debates over
globalization and multiculturalism, and the second and third waves of analyses
prompted by decolonization are all factors that could be mentioned in this regard. The
contributors to these volumes are aware of broader geo-political contexts, in which they
formulate their analyses, and they seek to account for these wider spheres of activity in
their discussions. They are also attuned to developments in a variety of elds such as
legal history, political theory, and post-colonial studies. But one difculty raised by their
work is the apparent lack of attention given to older reections about comparative
empire and the history of scholarship on the issue. Shmuel Eisenstadt, Moses Finley and
Michael Mann are frequently acknowledged in these chapters, but there seems to be
little sense of previous treatments of empire, whether from the early twentieth century or
the nineteenth century, let alone the eighteenth century. I did not expect to see obsolete
titles by obscure authorities but rather a feeling for how questions and problems
developed over time, and for an intellectual genealogy that engaged with the history of
political thought. The comparative study of empires will benet from an awareness that
questions about empire have been posed in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere for centuries.
Consider the tradition of American exceptionalism, which I just mentioned, and which
not only has a rich history but also developed in relation to ancient Greece and Rome. In
colonial America, intellectuals and statesmen already felt compelled to articulate a
22 J. Pitts, ‘Political theory of empire and imperialism’, The Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010), 211–35,
at 220.
23 See, e.g., R. Koebner, Empire (1961) and R. Koebner and H. D. Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and
Signicance of a Political Word, 1840–1960 (1964).
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relationship with Rome, to take sides with the Republic or the Empire, and to search for
moral and political lessons in the writings of the ancients. But some also emphatically
rejected parallels with ancient Greece and Rome and insisted on the dynamic singularity
of America. At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
asked, ‘Can we copy from Greece or Rome? Can this apply to the free yeomanry of
America? We surely differ from the whole. Our situation is unexampled.’24 America’s
difference and uniqueness was emphasized from an early date, before it was an empire,
and was often formulated in opposition to the civilizations of the past. This sense of
uniqueness illustrates how antiquity was deployed to nurture a particular vision of
nationhood and how it could be used, by later generations, to mark out the nation’s
special status so as to cast America outside the eld of comparative imperial history.
Or consider the issue of decline, which has been frequently invoked in discussions of
empire. In drawing attention to imperial decline as an interpretive problem, Edward
Gibbon was not immune to the historical forces swirling around him — European
colonialism, the post-humanist fascination with Rome, and the growth of international
maritime trade. His letters reveal a curiosity about developments in the American
colonies and the East India Company and implicitly compare the British and the Roman
empires.25 It would be important to understand how and why Gibbon developed a
conception of imperial decline and how it was adopted or refuted by writers after him.
Of course, Gibbon has been heavily studied and modern authors often refer to him and
the Decline and Fall by name, but few who talk in the present about American or
Roman decline seem to appreciate when the question of ‘decadence’ was framed in the
Enlightenment or why it took on a particular urgency then.26 The answers are complex,
but part of the explanation lies in the fact that, for many historians in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the idea of decline was predicated, in the words of David
Mattingly, on ‘a sense of wonder that something so emblematic of civilization and order
should have been brought down by “barbarians”’ and on a strong identication
between ancient Rome and modern Europe.27
With the comparisons of China and Rome, Scheidel, Mutschler and Mittag recognize
that their publications appear at a time when many are writing about China’s economic
growth and a putative geopolitical rivalry with America. How this environment shapes
their volumes is less clear than the fact that it looms large in the background, although
it can be said, at least, that an avowed emphasis on ‘empire’ places these books in a
separate category from comparative works on ancient scientic and philosophical
thought.28 Further, the relatively small number of China-based scholars in these
24 Quoted in M. Reinhold, Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States (1984), 106.
On early American attitudes to empire (especially in relation to the ancient world), see also C. J. Richard, The
Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment (1994), 85–122; E. Rothschild,
‘Real, pretended or imaginary dangers’, The New York Review of Books 51 (25 March 2004); and E. Shalev,
Rome Reborn on Western Shores: Historical Imagination and the Creation of the American Republic (2009).
25 See, e.g., the letter to J. B. Holroyd (15/5/75) in J. E. Norton (ed.), The Letters of Edward Gibbon, 3 vols
(1956), no. 303.
26 In relation to Gibbon, this question may be approached via the sequence of volumes on Barbarism and Religion
(1999–, 5 vols to date) by J. G. A. Pocock.
27 Mattingly, op. cit. (n. 9), 13.
28 The latter works are frequently oriented toward Greece rather than Rome. See, e.g., the many studies of
G. E. R. Lloyd, Adversaries and Authorities: Investigations into Ancient Greek and Chinese Science (1996);
The Ambitions of Curiosity: Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China (2003); Ancient Worlds,
Modern Reections: Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture (2004); The
Delusions of Invulnerability: Wisdom and Morality in Ancient Greece, China and Today (2005); Principles
and Practices in Ancient Greek and Chinese Science (2006); and Lloyd and N. Sivin, The Way and the Word:
Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece (2002). See also L. A. Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom
and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (1992); S. Shankman and S. W. Durrant, The
Siren and the Sage: Knowledge and Wisdom in Ancient Greece and China (2000); Shankman and Durrant
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collections suggests that their approaches are shaped largely by contemporary
Euro-American agendas and concerns. But these, in turn, have developed out of a long
history of Western and non-Western encounters with China, and what is missing in
these ne volumes is a treatment of how evolving political contexts have altered the
shape and nature of imperial comparisons over time. We require a denser archaeology
of knowledge in order to comprehend the connections between the analyses of the
present and the cultural, intellectual, and political actualities of the past. In a word, we
need to understand what makes it possible for us to grasp, or wish to grasp, two or
more empires together. So dominant a force is imperialism in Euro-American history
that we must speak of its historical inuence across the centuries and examine the extent
to which our own questions remain shaped by it.
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